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Prologue 
I should begin by telling you that I did not invent the title of my remarks 
today. Furthermore, you should know that when I first heard it, my initial 
response was to reject it and question the sanity of the organizers who 
suggested it. I simply didn’t know how to gain a foothold in addressing 
it. However, the more I thought about it the more I came to realize how 
the analogies of individual and organizational learning and adaptation 
can lead us to understand and appreciate many of the things that happen 
in our fields. So I decided to give it a try, and I am pleased to put the 
results of my efforts before you today.
My initial reaction should, however, provide a cautionary note to be 
kept in mind. We should take care to guard against a reification of the 
question. A social science–to say nothing of the social sciences as 
a whole–is not a real thing, a creature that learns. It is made up of 
multiple disciplines, areas, groups, and ongoing processes, which are, 
in turn, made up of thousands of individual persons. Furthermore, 
generalizations are difficult to come by. Nevertheless, I am confident 
that there are shared styles of learning among scientists, and that 
definite patterns of learning emerge. It is those patterns, the product 
of constantly recurring processes, on which I will focus.
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Social Sciences 
as Learning Systems
Scientific Learning, or Learning to Focus
Most of the social sciences–always with variations, as will be the case 
throughout these remarks–came into existence and experienced their 
early growth under the vision and legitimizing cloak of positive science. 
This meant above all that their search was directed toward discovering 
general knowledge and laws: laws of evolution, laws of economics, 
psychological laws, social laws. As often as not, some natural-science 
model, such as Newtonian physics or functionalist biology, was at hand 
as an image to emulate. Some dominant organizing focus–in effect, but 
not then called a master paradigm–for the emerging disciplines was 
sought, and some notion of the scientific unity of knowledge was also 
among the aspirations.
Given such orientations, one would expect–retrospectively–that the 
guiding principles for investigation would be the search for and 
demonstration of social-science laws. There has been evidence for this 
kind of pursuit, even to this day. But it has not been the main story; in 
fact it has been a receding story. Instead, social scientists have worked 
in the direction of particularizing their knowledge into smaller and more 
specialized subfields, theoretical perspectives, and research traditions, 
while still maintaining sometimes that general principles–such as sup-
ply-demand, psychological reinforcement, or social conformity–are at 
work. But in reality there is an economics of this, a sociology of that, and 
an anthropology of this and that. Proliferation and specialization have 
always increased, never decreased. The overall effects–contrary to the 
early ambitions–have been to disperse knowledge, to qualify, modify, 
and make contingent general principles, and to fragment rather than unify 
knowledge (Levine, 1994; Smelser, 1974).
The learning involved here is learning to pursue more particular topics 
and problems–opportunities if you will–and social scientists have proven 
themselves to be very good at this. What have been the mechanisms 
involved in this kind of pursuit?
 Some pressure to specify and particularize knowledge has arisen in 
 the normal course of scientific inquiry. Empirical investigation always 
 turns up the result that general laws do not work; the empirical 
 subject-matter of society inevitably turns out to be too complex  
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 and stubborn to permit easy demonstration of laws. Some social 
 scientists will also remain stubborn and insist on the validity of their 
 general principles–i.e., refuse to learn–much more on this tendency 
 later–but in most cases they will learn by qualifying, seeking 
 alternative explanations, and searching for new perspectives. The 
 end result of this process, of course, was particularization and 
 diversification of knowledge.
 The subject-matter studied by social scientists is itself becoming 
 more complex all the time. It is no secret that the rise and growth of 
 the social sciences coincided historically with the great commercial 
 and industrial revolutions beginning in the eighteenth century. 
 These revolutions meant above all a corresponding differentiation 
 and complexity of society and social arrangements. In some respects 
 this proved a blessing for the emerging social sciences. It has been 
 suggested, with good reason, that formal economics owes its 
 existence to the emergence of a differentiated market economy, 
 and that political science and sociology, respectively, could not have 
 crystallized as separate disciplines without a corresponding 
 differentiation between state and society. Yet this same process of 
 differentiation rendered their subject-matter increasingly more 
 complex, by producing multitudes of identifiable phenomena–insti-
 tutions, organizations, groups, and processes–all emerging as 
 identifiable and worthy of study. I argue, therefore, that the differen-
 tiation and diversity of the social sciences is, in part, a mirror of the 
 same processes in society, which forever produces new things to 
 understand and explain.
 Among the phenomena produced by rapid and irregular change, 
 moreover, are an increasing array of social problems–unemployment, 
 poverty, crime, family instability, and others. Many of these, such as 
 prostitution, were old; many, such as the emergence of labor-
 management strife, were new; and many were old but have become 
 problems because they come to reside in new social contexts or 
 because new and more exacting social and moral standards make 
 them social problems when they were not before–for example, 
 slavery and child labor. In all events, because the social sciences 
 were born in the context of faith in material and social progress, all 
 of these sciences–in their separate ways–are inclined to be sensitive 
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 to anomalies, imperfections, flaws, injustices, and problems in 
 society. By virtue of the same sensitivity, moreover, scholars have 
 been drawn to study them in hopes of ameliorating them. These 
 social problems themselves become foci of subfields–the economics 
 of poverty, the sociology of poverty, the politics of welfare, and so 
 on–thus producing new specialties and specialists.
 Another form of learning (adaptation might be a better term) is the 
 exportation and importation of concepts, theories, frameworks 
 between disciplines–also known as imperialism and lack of scientific 
 confidence, respectively, by those who sneer at the processes. All 
 disciplines export and are borrowed from, though the flow varies. 
 I would suggest that economics is a net exporter (mainly of market 
 models, rational choice models, and formal quantitative models), that 
geography is a net importer (Marxist geography, political geography, 
 feminist geography, postmodern geography, queer geography), and 
 that sociology, anthropology, and political science are intermediate–
 though political science has had heavy seasons of wholesale 
 importing of behavioralist approaches, functionalist approaches, and 
 rational-choice and game-theoretical approaches.
 Whatever the precise picture, exporting and importing are wide-
 spread phenomena. Willard van Orman Quine, the late philosopher 
 who did not love the social sciences very much, once compared 
 them to the Cargo Cults of Melanesia–that is, groups of despairing 
 peoples who are forever waiting for magical arrivals of ships filled 
 with unlimited supplies in the form of tinned foods, transistor radios, 
 and personal salvation. The unflattering analogy was that social 
 scientists seek their salvation by waiting for new theories, models, 
 and insights from outside. While caricatured, Quine’s dig struck a 
 nerve and was not altogether out of touch with reality. Exporting 
 and importing are, of course, one form of interdisciplinarity, and two 
 of their consequences are to make the social-science disciplines 
 more diverse internally and less distinguishable from one another.
 Closely related to exporting and importing are what Mattei Dogan 
 (1990) and others have called hybridization, or the proliferation of 
 new subspecialties by the selective fusing of ingredients from several 
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 disciplinary sources (Dogan and Pahre, 1990). Child-development is 
 a ready example, having ingredients of psychology, sociology, and 
 biological perspectives. Behavioral economics–fusing economics and 
 psychology–is another. Hybridization is, of course, another way of 
 making for diversity and complexity.
 Two more sources of focussing are perhaps less noble, but neverthe-
 less have to be mentioned. The first stems from the fact that social 
 scientists are implicated in prestige systems–as are all scientists and 
 scholars–and this means that they want to be noticed by colleagues 
 and others. Being noticed, of course, derives in part from excellent 
 scientific work, but it can also come from novel formulations that 
 capture the moment, from scathing attacks on leaders of the field, 
 and from igniting academic and political controversies. These 
 produce the “fads and foibles“ that so exercised the sociologist 
 Pitirim Sorokin (1956)–who, indeed, added to his own recognition 
 value by attacking them so savagely. They also produce “schools“ 
 and “sub-schools“ of thought, some of which have lasting value. 
 These kinds of activity, too, add to the disagreement and conflict, 
 and subtract from the consensus of academic disciplines.
 The second is the constant changing patterns of opportunities to 
 conduct research supported by external grants. I noted earlier 
 that academic disciplines tend to be sensitive to changes in the 
 economic, social, and political environments in which they live. 
 But they are not the only ones. As governmental agencies have 
 proliferated and as private foundations have continued to grow, 
 these agencies make it their business to be sensitive to concrete 
 social problems and opportunities. One of the ways they implement 
 their sensitivity, moreover, is to offer funds, sometimes in very 
 substantial amounts, to social scientists who, they believe, will 
 contribute directly or indirectly to social improvement by conducting 
 relevant scientific work. When Requests for Proposals go out, 
 moreover, we witness instances of demand creating its own supply 
 of “expert and qualified“ persons ready to offer promises and 
 receive funds that are offered. At the deviant extremes, we see 
 scientists who shape their proposals in the direction of the purposes 
 for which the support is intended, but skew the work in their own 
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 independent directions. The collective impact is to create new hives 
 of activity, new groups of scientists, and sometimes new subfields–
 by external acclaim, as it were.
This long list of mechanisms that produced splintering and diversity 
is meant to underscore my first fundamental point: that social scientists 
learn quickly and respond quickly to the opportunities in their diverse 
environments, and the result of this activity is an enormous and 
continuous spawning of their subject-matters. I pointed out earlier that 
the net effect of this is to take them further and further from their earlier 
mission to produce reliable, systematic, general knowledge. I can say 
this straightforwardly, without contradicting the equally valid truth that 
the quality of specialized knowledge continues to improve because of 
both conceptual, methodological, and technical innovations. 
However, social scientists have not learned–and it becomes increasingly 
difficult to learn–how to put back together what they have proliferated. 
All social-science disciplines still do theory in their fields, and they teach 
theory to their students and trainees in courses and in conducting 
research. But theory itself has become more subspecialized, and in some 
disciplines theory courses and textbooks teach types of theory, or if 
they teach what they call general theory it often seems to be partial in 
relation to their entire disciplines, and increasingly unrelated to the 
specialized, necessarily somewhat eclectic activity undertaken in concrete 
empirical research. This situation is a general one, though I of course 
acknowledge that it applies more forcefully in some disciplines than in 
others.
The main type of integrative work that currently goes on in the 
behavioral and social sciences is the interdisciplinary focus on a given area 
of study, intellectual problem, or social problem (Centre for Educational 
Research and Innovation, 1972). Sometimes this kind of activity crystal-
lizes into a distinctive subspecialization–such as organization studies–
which is really not identifiable with a single discipline, and in the case 
mentioned, is often located elsewhere, especially in schools of business 
and management. Sometimes interdisciplinary approaches are housed in 
organized research units peopled by faculty from different departments. 
Sometimes these interdisciplinary efforts yield mini-professional societies, 
as in the case of the group on network analysis, or in the many associ-
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ations focussing on area studies. Great value comes from these inter-
disciplinary societies–or interdisciplinary learning, if you will–but it is a 
rather specialized form of integration.
At the same time the hankering for some kind of general science and 
unity of knowledge persists. Some scholars try to advance general 
theories, and do. This hankering no doubt goes back to our historical 
roots. Certainly it lies behind the periodic declamations, in discipline after 
discipline, that all is hopelessly splintered, beyond organized comprehen-
sion, or, at worst, in crisis.
I cannot conclude this section without asking a few questions of you. Is 
not the impulse to integrate–to learn what it is all about–now obsolete, 
given the history of explosion, differentiation, and fragmentation of 
knowledge I have described? Is it not a form of romanticism, a harking 
back to earlier visions of the unity of knowledge, which did not happen 
then and certainly are much further from happening now? Is not the 
hand-wringing about the fragmentation and crisis some elaborate form 
of self-torture, expecting or hoping for something that was never meant 
to happen? Should we not, finally, change our expectations instead of 
being continuously disappointed that disciplinary unity seems further 
and further from being realized? Maybe the directions implied by these 
questions are not the way to go, but if we were to go that way we might 
be a little happier with life.
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Organizational Learning and Non-Learning
Thus far I have focussed more or less exclusively on the knowledge side 
of the social sciences–the directions of learning, if you will–and some 
of the consequences of the patterns I have identified. This scientific work, 
of course, must take place in some kind of structure of institutions, 
organizations, and social roles–though this social structure displays many 
variations. I refer to the departments, faculties and academies, the 
professional associations, the sources and forms of financial support 
and the professional academic roles in which most social scientists are 
incumbents. This is what we call infrastructure. While many features of 
this infrastructure have been devised–or have evolved–as ways of encour-
aging scientific work and creativity, their actual effects are of a mixed 
character. This portion of my remarks will be some reflections on these 
effects.
The first observation to be made about this infrastructure is how 
relatively stable it is over time, in contrast to the dynamism and flux of 
the knowledge produced by the scientists that inhabit that infrastructure. 
The universities, divided into faculties according to branches of knowl-
edge, are the most ancient of institutions, and despite the great sub-
divisions of faculties into academic departments, the university form has 
persisted. Departments or faculties are associations of professional peers, 
the limits being defined by academic subject-matter. They are finely 
graded by rank and prestige, but in general are granted a great deal of 
freedom and are subjected to limited authority–the latter varying con-
siderably along lines of national and political tradition. 
The professional associations are created and peopled by groups, and 
evolve into similar structures with rather similar functions from field 
to field–to define and endow professional identity, to serve as status-
protecting and status-advancing bodies that sometimes lobby politically, 
to exchange knowledge, and to gather periodically in collective expres-
sion of common membership. Academic roles are also typically privileged 
roles accorded with a high level of political freedom and job security 
(“tenure“), and those who are successful in these roles are rewarded 
mainly with much prestige, but seldom with much wealth or power. It 
would no doubt be wrong to describe these forms of institutional and 
organizational stability in terms of inability to learn organizationally, 
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because the structures are so resistant to change even if individuals and 
groups might want to change them. What are the forces that make for 
such structural stability? I do not think we know, but I will mention two 
factors for your consideration.
 The first factor is cultural. Much of the university system has its 
 origins in the church, and despite a long-term process of secular-
 ization that obscures that connection, universities and colleges retain 
 a flavor of the sacred, in part because of their role as creator, 
 guardian, and sometimes critic of national and civilizational culture, 
 and in part because they share responsibility for the education of the 
 society’s younger generations. In so far as they partake of the sacred, 
 they have an interest in preservation, in tradition, in ritual, and in 
 continuity. I do not want to overstress this factor, but want to 
 mention it because we academics, being mostly secular, if not anti-
 religious in outlook, tend to overlook it.
 The second factor is political-economic. Being embedded in univer-
 sities and academies with a multiplicity of departments and faculties, 
 these units are budgeted as such, and are in the nature of the cases 
 pitted against one another in competition for resources. They rep-
 resent themselves as scientific or scholarly disciplines, important in 
 the life of the college or university, and thus meriting resources for 
 maintaining themselves, their numbers, their students, and their 
 space. It is incumbent upon them to represent themselves as such, 
 because different, more transient units are notoriously more 
 vulnerable from a budgetary point of view. In a word, faculties and 
 departments–and in the larger society, professional associations–are 
 deeply implicated as vested interests in a system of competition 
 among multiple academic interest groups.
Now I turn to a few observations about the implications of these struc-
tures for scientific learning and creativity.
First, the department and the discipline. Here we have a mixed story. 
Quite obviously these are the seat of the education and training of future 
professionals, and, as such, the creators of the human capital on which 
future scientific work and creativity depends. At the same time faculty 
members are notoriously interested in cloning students into people 
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like themselves, so that one aspect of professional training is to pass on 
not only knowledge, but also their own preoccupations, issues and 
“hang-ups“ to those they train–a distinct source of intergenerational 
non–learning. (Much more on “hang-ups“ later.) 
More generally, the power of disciplines themselves constitutes a 
constraint on looking outward beyond disciplinary boundaries. The care-
ers of the young are in the hands of their disciplinary seniors who hire 
them, evaluate them, and vote on them for advancement. Under these 
circumstances it is perilous to challenge too much or wander too much. 
One of the universal human motivations is the yearning for immortality, 
and in the academic world this yearning is felt to be realized by having 
one’s students carry on one’s work. The collective impact of this is inevi-
tably a conservatizing influence.
Second, we should look at the same process from the standpoint of 
academic tenure and the typical career contour of the professional social 
scientist. The picture is once again mixed. On the one hand, the insti-
tution of tenure is a powerful guarantee against the intrusion of exterior 
political forces in the lives of professionals–this is the core feature of 
academic freedom. Furthermore, when tenure carries with it a comfort-
able income, it provides the social scientist with year-to-year protection 
from distractions from his or her work occasioned by the need to find 
other paid work. Such are the benefits. This system of supporting profes-
sionals in universities and academies–supplemented by scientific workers 
in industry and government–has created unprecedented armies of full-
time supported seekers and creators of knowledge.
Careers in scientific work, however, may be inhibited or deflected by the 
very apparatus that is meant to encourage them. The socially-accepted 
motivations for scientists is that they be committed to a calling–again, 
of a quasi-religious nature–and that they may strive for recognition and 
prestige. At the same time the motives for security and continuity are 
among the repertoire of considerations affecting academic careers. 
As mentioned, the pre-tenure years have their pressures to conform to 
expectations of one’s seniors, however much the ideology of originality 
and creativity is officially voiced. Too often–at least in the American 
setting I know–decisions are made on the relatively “safe“ criterion of 
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advancing young scholars on the basis of numbers of publications in 
prestigious refereed journals, which becomes a rather stylized process, 
encouraging young scholars to assume a calculative, incremental orien-
tation toward organizing his or her research.
After tenure is granted, the scientist, even if inhibited in the struggle to 
attain it, is in principle liberated from that struggle and free to move 
in new directions. In many instances this is precisely what happens in 
the mid-career and senior years. At the same time there are two counter-
forces to this development. First, we might say that the damage has 
already been done, if I might overstate the case. For many, pursuing a 
later career means continuing along the lines that have been cemented 
in the younger years, as if the law of psychological reinforcement is 
working itself out. Second, the principle of evaluation by seniors may 
continue, as scholars continue to work their way toward the top.
While on this line of reasoning, I cannot resist mentioning the subject 
of peer review, which has long been institutionalized as a mechanism for 
career advancement in college, university, and academy settings. It has 
become more widespread in recent times, as government agencies and 
foundations have embraced the support of research in the social sciences 
as part of their missions, whether out of the increasingly-perceived need 
for knowledge as a basis for enlightened policy or out of the lingering 
conviction that understanding–scientific understanding–is a necessary 
ingredient in social amelioration and social improvement.
The logic justifying peer review is that the most effective way to assure 
quality in research supported is to rely on the advice of experts–those 
who have been active and successful in the relevant arena of research. 
To choose the best who have achieved is a way of securing the best 
talent among those who are aspiring. In practice, those agencies who are 
responsible for granting research support are themselves motivated to do 
their best, so they choose evaluating peers on a safe basis, relying mainly 
on the known or reputed status of the prospective reviewers. Defensible 
as the practice is, it does serve to reproduce the whole system of evalu-
ation that I have described, and runs the risk of assuring the continuity 
of scientific correctness. For this reason and others, the system of peer 
review has come under attack as a self-serving mechanism for science. 
The irony, however, is that it tends to endure because superior alternative 
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methods are difficult to devise without falling back on ignorance or ope-
ning the door to non-scientific criteria–including 
political criteria.
I have reviewed for you several social-structural sources of non-learning 
in the social sciences, some of which apply more widely in academia. 
Actually, what I have described is a combination of structural arrange-
ments and the playing out of human failings. I will readily admit two of 
my failings in putting forth this diagnosis. First, if you ask me to provide 
measures of the diverse tendencies and their impact on learning in 
the social sciences, I will tell you that such measures are not available, 
and that my case rests on a mix of logical analysis and a lifetime of 
experience in academia and the “research establishment.“ And, second, 
if you ask me to produce a range of reforms that will make for a less 
imperfect system, I will disappoint you on that count, too, beyond saying 
that collectively we as social scientists have to be ever-diligent to keep 
our minds’ procedures open so that both the scientifically correct and the 
scientifically high-risk but potentially high-payoff activities find nurtur-
ance in the system.
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Sectarian Tendencies and Non-Learning
Twice in my remarks I have referred to religious or quasi-religious 
ingredients in the social-science enterprise. In this third and final section 
of my remarks I will pursue an even more explicit religious analogy, bring 
out the issues of faith, orthodoxy, sectarian conflict, and schismatic 
tendencies–all of which come to constitute serious obstacles to scientific 
learning and advancement.
One of the early scientific aspirations of the behavioral and social 
sciences is that they would accumulate knowledge in the same way that 
the natural sciences were thought to accumulate. The essence of that 
model was that through constant experimentation and discovery, science 
continuously builds on its own past but, at the same time, discards that 
past as prior knowledge is shown to be erroneous or limited. As a result, 
the study of the history of science is largely a matter of curiosity. That, 
we might say, is the classical model of how learning occurs in the natural 
sciences. 
Whether knowledge in the natural sciences accumulates according to 
that script has become a matter of continuous controversy, especially in 
the era that began with the publication of Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions (1972) and extending right up through the continuing 
post-modernist assault on science from its vantage point of a radical 
epistemological relativism.
Be all that as it may, the developmental picture in the behavioral and 
social sciences is not that of the earlier model of knowledge accumu-
lation. Rather, it is a story of continuous invention of new or revived the-
ories or perspectives which capture the imagination of a subclass 
of scientists, and occasion a season of research activity and the consoli-
dation of approaches as “schools“ or “approaches.“ At a certain point 
in this process, however, criticisms of the approach appears, and leads to 
an appreciation of its errors, limitations, and biases. As often as not these 
critics are inclined to invent new frameworks designed to supersede the 
outmoded old one. The new approaches, moreover, become “schools “ 
or “approaches“ of their own, and they too become vulnerable to the 
same dynamic of invention, elaboration, consolidation, and attack. 
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The peculiar character of this dynamic is that the older approaches 
seldom die altogether. Some do, but more often they persist or go under-
ground for a time, only to reappear in altered form, which then perhaps 
gets the word “neo“ in front of the older name and enjoys a new season 
as a school. This whole process, repeated hundreds of time in the history 
of our disciplines, yields an accumulation of sorts–in richness and diver-
sity of paradigms, schools, approaches, and sub-approaches. But it is not 
accumulation of successive discoveries and discardings of the past on the 
basis of these discoveries. Furthermore, this process, like those I sketched 
out at the beginning of my remarks, contributes to the diversity and 
dispersion of the behavioral and social sciences as more or less coherent 
paradigms.
To make this process more concrete and visible, let me quickly 
enumerate a few notable paradigms:
 The eclipse of classical evolutionary theory in anthropology and 
 sociology by the diffusionist approach (which challenged the linearity 
 of change processes) and anthropological and sociological 
 functionalism (which stressed contemporary systemic interrelations 
 of structures in society, rather than evolutionary stages and 
 survivals).
 The subsequent attack on functionalism on the grounds that it could 
 not explain conflicts and contradictions, and that it was ideologically 
 conservative. This occurred mainly in the 1960s and 1970s, and 
 saw the simultaneous rise of conflict sociology, radical sociology 
 and a renewed stress on micro-sociological approaches as symbolic  
 interactionism and ethnomethodology.
 In economics, the Keynesian critique of classical equilibrium theory, 
 the consolidation of Keynesianism, attacks on the limitation of 
 Keynesian theory, the development of varieties of neo-Keynesianism, 
 the separation of distinct new lines of monetary and fiscal policy 
 economics, and the emergence of distinctive “supply-side“ and   
 “demand-side“ economics.
 I have already mentioned the assault on traditional political theory 
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 and comparative historical analysis of political institutions as 
 “unscientific“, the simultaneous rise of the behaviorist and func-
 tionalist emphases to take their place in the 1950s and 1960s, and 
 a similar “rational choice“ revolution in the 1980s and 1990s.
As mentioned, the net result of these processes–visible in all the behav-
ioral and social sciences–is a kaleidoscope of competing paradigms, the-
ories, and approaches.
One aspect of these dynamics–and here is where the religious analogy 
comes in–is that social scientists do not usually accept the idea that 
these various approaches might comfortably co-exist, side by side, as 
so many alternative ways of pursuing knowledge. Far from it. Instead 
they tend to identify themselves with the paradigms they favor, and to 
denigrate the approaches they regard as inferior. It is only a small step to 
begin to endow their own approach with a certain sacred quality, and 
as soon as this step is taken, the stage is set for the periodic outbreak 
of holy wars among the competing sects and cults. Perhaps I exaggerate 
here, but not too much. Sectarianism in the social sciences involves 
the drift of different theoretical and methodological preferences toward 
sacred objects, which believers embrace with fervor. Simultaneously 
they lash out at other approaches–as critics of their own–with equal, 
negative fervor. The net result is groups of social scientists talking among 
themselves and not much to others.
Vivid illustration of all this can be seen in Norman Cantor’s book review 
of a book on medieval plagues that appeared recently in The Chronicle of 
Higher Education. In the course of his review he turned his sights on his 
fellow medievalists:
 My colleagues among American medievalists always remind me of 
 those Boer farmers in South Africa in the 1860s and 1870s, trying  
 to gain a living from their hardscrabble farms on the veldt, while a 
 dozen or so yards beneath the soil lay some of the largest diamond 
 and gold deposits in the world. So it is with academic medievalists–
 exclusively addressing only each other in conferences, journal 
 articles, and university-press books, while there is, I believe, great 
 and unsatisfied interest in the Middle Ages among the educated  
 public (Cantor, 2001).
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To turn this line of thought to the main purpose of the occasion, such 
developments foster non-learning in the extreme by shutting out other 
influences as foreign and shutting down lines of inquiry and research 
outside their restricted groups. Looking at it from the standpoint 
of rational, open, and scientific pursuit of knowledge, it seems outright 
insidious.
To push this religious analogy one step further, I might point out that 
different social sciences have developed different modes of handling sec-
tarianism, controversy and heterodoxy in their midst. Economics seems 
to have evolved a mode that resembles that of the Catholic Church. For 
example, when the classical mode of perfect competition was challenged 
in the 1930s by Joan Robinson and Edwin Chamberlain, the theoretical 
outcome was to alter the parameters of market behavior, and then to 
calculate how economic actors would behave within that framework. 
Similarly, when the classical assumption of complete market information 
was challenged by those appreciating the importance of risk and un-
certainty in the market, the principal outcome was to build models of 
rational response to risk and uncertainty situations. When the principle 
of rationality was challenged by Herbert Simon, this triggered a tradition 
in economics, political science and organization studies known as 
bounded rationality. The connection with Catholicism is not with its long 
tradition of repressing heterodoxy cruelly and sometimes violently, but 
in the formation of orders within the Church. In that connection, the 
principle was one of confronting divergent and heterodox tendencies–
Jesuit, Benedictine, etc.–by institutionalizing them as orders, which are 
then regarded as variations within the continuity of the basic faith in 
the Church.
Anthropology and sociology have taken an alternative path. Perhaps 
never as coherent as economics from the beginning, the dominant 
pattern of accommodation is to permit schismatic splitting-off of new 
approaches into schools, without apparent attempts to incorporate or 
reunite them with the larger disciplinary tradition, except in name. 
This is the pattern of schismatic secession of sects, which is so typical 
of Protestant Christianity. That tradition, born out of the rejection of the 
sacredness of holy authority, found itself crippled when it came to 
handling internal conflict by the enforcement of authority, and corre-
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spondingly ill-equipped to handle conflict in ways other than having the 
warring parties hive off from one another into separate organizations.
Political science is still another variant. While resembling anthropology 
and sociology more than it does economics, many political scientists 
have become fixated on democracy as a political system. Political theo-
rists attempt to identify the theoretical essentials of democracy, while 
an army of comparative political scientists attempts to identify how 
different national cases deviate from that theoretical model, in the pro-
cess they identify many subtypes of democracy. This might be said to 
resemble the tradition of Platonism, or the pursuit of an idealized reality 
of pure types, none of which are realized in this earthly, imperfect world.
So much for these religious aspects of our quest for knowledge. As a 
final illustration of “non-learning“ associated with these aspects, let me 
point out the tendency for certain philosophical and methodological ten-
sions to repeat themselves in the social sciences, without any apparent 
learning emerging from the periodic confrontations. Because my time is 
so short, I will only mention a few such controversies in the hope that 
you are sufficiently familiar with them to recognize the phenomena I am 
underscoring:
 The struggle between the principle of “original sin“ in theoretical 
 formulations vs. the assumed possibility of human betterment. 
 Freudian psychoanalysis and its theory of the instincts captures the 
 essence of the former, and the progressivist impulse in the late nine-
 teenth and twentieth centuries is an example of the latter. Marxism  
 captured both in its theory–the inherent evils of capitalism and the 
 promise of purposive human redemption and perfection in revo-
 lutionary communism. 
 The possibility of a general science of society vs. the antagonism to 
 this found in various expressions of historicism.
 Positive science vs. the relativism of knowledge.
 Quantitative vs. qualitative methods as roads to knowledge.
–
–
–
–
 Value-neutral vs. socially and potentially engaged knowledge, one 
 version of which is positive vs. normative economics, another of 
 which is scientific vs. reform sociology.
These constitute a final form of non-learning, a set of repetition-compul-
sions in our midst. We sometimes forget that they are old and recurring, 
but think that they are something entirely new and original and exciting. 
In any event we do not seem to learn from them. I personally have the 
hope that one of these years we will find ways to break through these 
repetitive conflicts and fashion out new theoretical and methodological 
positions that render them moot and not worth fighting over. I fear, 
however, that this is a vain hope for the foreseeable future, and that the 
more likely scenario is that they will continue to occupy our attention as 
one ingredient in this panoply of learning and non-learning principles in 
our ongoing scientific strivings.
20
–
References
Cantor, Norman F., 2001, “Studying the Black Death,“ The Chronicle of 
Higher Education, Section 2,  April 27, p. B 10
Centre for Educational Research and Innovation (CERI), 1972, 
Interdisciplinarity: Problems of Teaching and Research in Universities, Paris: 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
Dogan, Mattei, Robert Pahre, 1990, Creative Marginality: Innovation at the 
Intersections of Social Sciences, Boulder, CO: Westview Press
Kuhn, Thomas S., 1970, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press
Levine, Donald, 1994, Visions of the Sociological Tradition, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press
Smelser, Neil J., 1974, “Sociology’s Next Decades: Centrifugality, Conflict, 
Accommodation,“ Cahiers de Recherche Sociologique, Vol. 14, Printemps, 
pp. 35-48
Sorokin, Pitirim A., 1956, Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociology and Related 
Sciences, Chicago: H. Regnery
21
22
The Author
Neil J. Smelser
Born 1930 in Kahoka, Missouri, Ph.D. in Sociology 1958 (Harvard 
University), psychoanalyst 1971; Professor of Sociology, University of 
California, Berkeley; Director, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral 
Sciences, Stanford (1994–2001). Numerous professional activities and 
memberships, e. g. Editor, American Sociological Review; Chairman of 
the Board, Social Science Research Council; Member, Council of the 
American Academy of Arts and Sciences; Member, Board of Trustees, 
Russell Sage Foundation; Presidential Advisor, Commission on the Causes 
and Prevention of Violence; Vice President, International Sociological 
Association. Co-editor-in-chief with Paul B. Baltes, “International  
Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences“, 26 volumes (2001).
Photographer: Peter Hinsel
23
WZB Lectures
1 
Lord Ralf Dahrendorf, Öffentliche Sozialwissenschaft – Nützlich? Lehrreich? 
Unterhaltsam?, September 9, 2001
2 
Neil J. Smelser, Social Sciences as Learning Systems, November 16, 2001
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin
für Sozialforschung
D-10785 Berlin
Reichpietschufer 50
 Neil J. Smelser
Social Sciences
as Learning Systems
WZB Lectures 2
